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ABSTRACT 
  We study the impact of macroeconomic instability on business exit in a world 
where acquisition and bankruptcy are co-determined. Our objective is to discover 
how the processes that determine bankruptcies and acquisitions depend on the 
macroeconomic environment, particularly, macroeconomic instability. To this end we 
estimate competing risks hazard regression models using data on UK quoted firms 
spanning a thirty-eight year period that witnessed several business cycles. We find that 
macroeconomic instability has opposite effects on bankruptcy hazard and acquisition 
hazard, raising the former and lowering the latter. While it is not surprising that 
bankruptcy hazard is counter-cyclical and acquisition hazard pro-cyclical, it is 
noteworthy that the US business cycle is a better predictor of UK acquisitions and 
bankruptcies than the UK cycle itself. 
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 1 Introduction
Firm exits, through bankruptcy or acquisition, are extreme outcomes in the
continuous process of corporate restructuring. Exits are held to be cyclical
in nature, with bankruptcies associated with economic downturns and ac-
quisitions with recoveries. However, neither the impact of macroeconomic
instability on the propensity to exit, nor the way in which bankruptcy and
acquisition interrelate as competing hazards to the survival of the ¯rm, has
received much attention in the literature. Analysis at the ¯rm level has
tended to focus either on bankruptcy or on acquisition, and on the way exit
is determined by the characteristics of the ¯rm and its industry. Analysis
of the in°uence of the macroeconomic environment has tended to focus on
the impact of aggregate shocks on aggregate amounts of ¯rm formation and
dissolution.
We investigate the impact of macroeconomic conditions on ¯rm failure
and acquisition using a framework in which these are related processes and
where changes in the macroeconomic environment may interact with relevant
¯rm and industry features in amplifying or attenuating exit hazards. We
investigate these two issues using data on all listed UK companies over an
extended period - 1965 to 2002 - spanning several business cycles. We use
a competing-risks model to consider explicitly the joint determination of the
probability of an operating ¯rm being acquired and of it going bankrupt,
where these mutually exclusive processes compete with each other to restrict
the survival of the ¯rm. Unlike discrete outcome models, hazard models
explicitly incorporate the timing of alternative outcomes; this is important
when the objective is to identify the in°uence of macroeconomic conditions
on business failure. We use a rich set of ¯rm level covariates along with
industry and macro variables that might a®ect the likelihood of the ¯rm
being acquired, or going bankrupt.
The next section reviews the literature. Section 3 presents an economic
framework for the joint determination of bankruptcy and acquisition deci-
sions. The data are described in Section 4. Section 5 discusses hazard regres-
sion models of bankruptcy and acquisition in a competing risks framework.
Section 6 presents the results of the estimated hazard regression models. Our
conclusions are in Section 7.
22 Literature1
The extant literature on ¯rm exit is reviewed in Siegfried and Evans (1994)
and Caves (1998). The role of ¯rm speci¯c factors, age and size in particu-
lar, in determining ¯rm failure are central in theoretical models of the ¯rm
life-cycle, including passive learning (Jovanovic, 1982; Hopenhayn, 1992) and
active learning (Ericson and Pakes, 1995; Pakes and Ericson, 1998) formu-
lations. Exit rates are predicted to decline with ¯rm age, due to ¯rm-level
learning. In the credit scoring literature, ¯nancial ratios including leverage,
cash°ow, and pro¯tability, join ¯rm age, size and industry as determinants of
failure, with binary response models providing the basis for probability scores
of company failure (Ta²er, 1982; Cuthbertson and Hudson, 1996; Lennox,
1999).
Several studies have noted that ¯rm entry and exit rates are highly cor-
related, though the nature of the relationship between the two di®er across
industries, as well as over the ascending and descending stages of the business
cycle. Empirical macro-studies that relate the macroeconomic environment
to business performance in the UK note that movements in the aggregate
failure rate of business establishments coincide with changes in macroeco-
nomic performance (Hudson, 1986; Department of Trade and Industry, 1989;
Robson, 1996). Exit rates rise during the downturn and both growth rates
and exits vary with size and ¯nancial stability (\life cycle hypothesis"), as
well as nominal and real shocks.
The economic cycle (characterised by macroeconomic variables such as
interest rate, unemployment rate and retail sales growth rate) a®ect prof-
itability (Geroski and Machin, 1993; Machin and Van-Reenen, 1993; Geroski
et al., 1997) and gearing, and thereby in°uence company failures (Everett
and Watson, 1998). There is evidence for di®erential impact of changes in
the macroeconomic environment on di®erent segments of the cross-section of
quoted companies (Higson et al., 2002, 2003). In an examination of the e®ect
of changes in interest rates on insolvency, Young (1995) found companies
vulnerable to unanticipated changes in real interest rates.
Caves (1998) reviewing the sizeable literature on ¯rm exit, concludes: \...
these studies ... control for macroeconomic conditions in various ways and
1For a more detailed discussion and additional references, see Bhattacharjee et al.
(2002).
3degrees, but they leave the impression that ... hazard rates are rather in-
sensitive to the observed variation in the macro environment" (p.1958). A
notable exception is Goudie and Meeks (1991) who simulate ¯nancial state-
ments of UK ¯rms, contingent on macroeconomic developments, and observe
signi¯cant asymmetric and non-linear impact of the exchange rate upon fail-
ure rates. Through retrospective analysis of macro shocks they argue that
for a signi¯cant minority among the major failed corporations, the shock
determined their collapse.
Theoretical work on acquisition has emphasised choices made by ¯rms
between making acquisitions or becoming targets, depending on ¯rm level
features and the overall environment. Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) focus
on the role of Tobin's Q in acquisition investments of ¯rms. In Shleifer and
Vishny (2003) ¯rms make acquisitions or become targets, to bene¯t from
temporary mis-valuation of stock prices.
The large body of empirical work on acquisitions is mainly based on ag-
gregates, and fall into two branches. The ¯rst aims at understanding time
series patterns in aggregate acquisition activity, and ¯nd evidence of acquisi-
tion waves and stochastic trends. The second, the acquisition-macro branch,
seeks explanation of acquisition wave patterns in terms of economy wide
macroeconomic and ¯nancial variables that display similar cyclical patterns.
Evidence suggests that acquisition activity is positively related to aggregate
share price levels (recently, Benzing, 1991, 1993; Clarke and Ioannidis, 1996).
For other economy-wide measures, di®erent periods and data sets present
con°icting results.
Though bankruptcy and acquisition have each generated large literatures,
there has been relatively little analysis of these processes within a uni¯ed
framework. Peel and Wilson (1989) argued that the acquisition of a dis-
tressed ¯rm should be modelled as a distinct alternative to corporate failure.
Schary (1991) provided a theoretical basis for considering acquisitions and
bankruptcies as alternative routes to exit, pointing out that while bankrupt-
cies and acquisitions are both forms of exit, they will have di®erent economic
causes: while failing ¯rms may avoid bankruptcy by being acquired, there are
other economic motives and modalities for acquisitions. Models that address
issues that are closest to our interests include Cooley and Quadrini (2006)
who present a general equilibrium model of ¯rm reactions to ¯nancial drivers,
and show how ¯nancial factors a®ect ¯rm survival through the internal ¯-
nance channel. Delli Gatti et al. (2003) develop a theoretical model linking
4the macroeconomic environment, ¯nancial fragility and the entry and exit
of ¯rms. Corres and Ioannides (1996) allows for three kinds of exits - bank-
ruptcy, endogenous exits when the current value of expected pro¯t stream
falls below a threshold (voluntary liquidation), and exogenous exits caused
by macroeconomic shocks.
The empirical study closest to ours is Wheelock and Wilson (2000) who
identify characteristics that make individual US banks more likely to fail or
be acquired. They use bank-speci¯c information to estimate competing-risks
hazard regression models for failure and acquisition. Recent empirical work
on UK industry by Disney et al. (2003) examines the UK establishment
(ARD) database for the period 1986-1991 and estimate a hazard models of
new ¯rm survival. About two-thirds of new entrants are observed to exit
within ¯ve years; approximately half these were takeovers by other compa-
nies under the same ownership groups. They note that exit and entry rates
correlate strongly, both across time and within industries. Exit rates decline
with age indicating the importance of learning.
3 An Economic Framework of Competing Exit
Risks
This section presents an economic framework for analysing the manner in
which the competing risks of bankruptcy and acquisition are in°uenced by
macroeconomic conditions, speci¯cally, macroeconomic instability. We use
the terms macroeconomic instability and macroeconomic uncertainty inter-
changibly in this paper. Our formulation is in the spirit of Jovanovic and
Rousseau (2001, 2002).
An important innovation in the theoretical model developed in this sec-
tion lies in explicitly incorporating macroeconomic e®ects within a model of
¯rm exits through bankruptcy and acquisitions. The existing theoretical and
empirical literature has pointed out several ways in which ¯rm performance,
including exits, are related to changes in the macroeconomic environment
(see, for example, Wadhwani, 1986; Cuthbertson and Hudson, 1996; Higson
et al., 2002; and Delli Gatti et al., 2003). These macroeconomic condi-
tions can be characterised both by the aggregate level of economic activity
(broadly speaking, economic expansions and downturn) as well as the degree
5of instability in the macroeconomic environment.
While ¯rm exits through compulsory liquidation increase during periods
of severe downturn in the aggregate economy (see, for example, Caballero and
Hammour, 1994), merger waves are broadly procyclical (Shleifer and Vishny,
2003). On the other hand, instability potentially a®ects ¯rm exits in two
ways. First, lenders are less willing to lend when there is higher instability
(Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1990); this channel increases credit constraints on
¯rms and leads some ¯rms to bankruptcy. Second, uncertainty can induce
growing ¯rms to delay their decisions to invest in acquired capital (Dixit,
1989; Lambrecht and Myers, 2007).
Further, the e®ect of uncertainty on business performance may be asym-
metric, particularly in the presence of credit constraints (Bernanke and Gertler,
1989; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). This asymmetry has important implica-
tions for the way instability is measured, and is discussed later in the paper.
Our economic model, which takes explicit account of the above macroeco-
nomic e®ects on ¯rm exits, is described below.
At any time, , each ¯rm, , is at some risk of exit through bankruptcy
or by being acquired. Figure 1 gives a schematic representation of the way
macroeconomic conditions a®ect exit risks. On one side are ¯rms that exit
due to ¯nancial distress (through bankruptcy or through being acquired), or
choose to exit even though they are not distressed. Adverse macroeconomic
conditions increase the pool of ¯rms in ¯nancial distress. On the other side
are investor ¯rms who are in the market for acquisitions. Any ¯rm that is
not distressed will be characterised by some optimal level of investment ,
conditional on the level and stability of the macroeconomy. This optimal
investment, which maximises the expected present value of the ¯rms' future
cash °ows, will comprise both investment in new capital,  and acquired
capital,  . The balance between  and  will depend on the relative prices
of acquired and new capital, as well as on the ¯xed and adjustment cost of
acquisitions.
Let the -th ¯rm's state of technology (or e±ciency) at time  be denoted
by  and its capital by . Firms operate under an AK type production
function2 which takes the form (). Here () is akin to the output-
capital ratio and depends on ¯rm e±ciency: ()  0. We assume
2For a full discussion of the AK production function, widely used in the growth litera-
ture, see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003).
6that the dynamics in  and the economy wide macro-environment variable
of interest,  (denoting instability) are each governed by Markov transition
processes.  and  are each assumed to be positively autocorrelated, and
independent of each other. Hence,  and  are jointly Markov, i.e.,
[+1 · 
0+1 · 
0j =  = ] = (
0
0j)
Pro¯ts can then be written as [() ¡ () ¡  ¡  ¡ ()], where
 and  are the (per unit capital) investments in new and acquired capital
respectively ( =  + ), () is the (per unit capital) adjustment cost
of investment, and () is the ¯rm speci¯c impact of macro-environment on
pro¯ts. () is increasing and convex in , and (0) = 0. The price of new
capital is normalised to unity, and  denotes the price of acquired capital
(  1). Then, the market value of the ¯rm per unit of capital under the














is the expected present value of capital in the next period given the ¯rm's 
and the economy's  today, and  is the rate of depreciation. Since  and 
are independent and positively autocorrelated, () is increasing in  and
decreasing in . Denote by () the level of  at which the ¯rm is indi®erent
between exiting and staying in business, given macroeconomic conditions,
and by ¤() the level of technology at which the ¯rm is indi®erent between
staying out of the acquisitions market or entering it.3
In a period of economic stability, when demand is more predictable, the
incidence of ¯nancial distress will be lower. The smaller pool of distressed
¯rms may also face a larger number of potential acquirers whose investment
policies are encouraged by macroeconomic stability. Thus ¯rms that are on
the verge of bankruptcy will have a higher probability of being rescued, and
3Assuming a ¯xed deadweight cost of investing in acquired capital ensures existence of
a threshold level ¤, above which a ¯rm invests in acquired capital, and below which it
does not (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002).
7the observed bankruptcy rates can be expected to be lower. Further, in
such periods the hazard of acquisitions will be higher, even though there are
fewer distressed ¯rms that are candidates for acquisition. With the boost to
investment in more stable periods, the market for acquisitions may tighten,
driving up the market price of acquired assets. This can be expected to
induce a larger number of non-distressed ¯rms to enter the pool of potential
acquirees. These would be ¯rms who ¯nd the o®ers from potential acquirers
to be higher than their own continuation values (Jovanovic and Rosseau,
2001).
The implications of changes in  for ¯rm exits and acquisitions can be
understood with reference to a plot of the four regions of , (Jovanovic and
Rousseau, 2002). Let   , then  ()  () and ¤ ()  ¤() (Figure
2). In a period with higher , a larger number of ¯rms decide to exit, and
fewer ¯rms decide to acquire. Hence, a larger number of ¯rms are likely to
go bankrupt during such periods.
Overall, in a period of economic stability, the propensity for bankruptcy
will be lower, and the propensity for acquisitions will be higher. A testable
implication of the model is that the impacts of macroeconomic instability on
the likelihood of bankruptcy and acquisition are of opposite signs.
4 Data
The evaluation of the impact of macroeconomic °uctuations on business ex-
its requires data running over several business cycles. We use a database
of ¯rm quoted in the UK, constructed by combining the Cambridge-DTI,
DATASTREAM and EXSTAT databases of ¯rm accounts. The combined
¯rm level accounting data provides an unbalanced panel of about 4,100 UK
listed companies over the period 1965 to 2002. There were 206 instances of
bankruptcy and 1858 acquisitions among 48,046 ¯rm years over the 38 year
period.4 In terms of hazard model analysis, the data are right-censored and
4A ¯rm that has irretrievably entered the path to bankruptcy may, in a precursor phase
of distress, stop publishing accounts one or two years prior to actually being declared
bankrupt. From the point of view of econometrically modelling bankruptcy it is sensible
to reassign the date of \real" bankruptcy to the year of last published accounts when
the ¯rm has been declared legally bankrupt within a 2 year period. Our assignment of a
bankruptcy to a particular point in time captures the date of economic bankruptcy rather
8left-truncated.5
We use the term `bankruptcy' to denote the event of compulsory liquida-
tion. We use the term `acquisition' to denote the event of business combi-
nation, which may take the form of a merger, an acquisition or a takeover.
Interchangeable use of these words is standard in this literature.6
4.1 Measures of macroeconomic conditions
We use the following empirical proxies for macroeconomic conditions:
² As a measure of the business cycle (), we use a quarterly Hodrick-
Prescott-¯ltered7 series of UK output per capita ( = 100).
Given the strong trading linkages of the UK industrial sector with the
global economy, and particularly with the US economy, it is likely that
the global economic environment will a®ect the exit decisions and out-
comes for UK ¯rms.
² We allow for the possible impact of the global economy by including a
similar measure of the US business cycle.
² Real interest rates are measured as the yield on 20-year sovereign bonds,
less the annual rate of in°ation.
than declaration of bankruptcy. We assign accounting data for each company ¯scal year
to the calendar year that covers the majority of the accounting year corresponding to the
¯scal year.
5The data used pertain to years, since 1965, during which each company is listed in the
London Stock Exchange. Hence, for each company, the available data are left-truncated,
and do not pertain to the entire period that it is listed.
6It is somewhat rare for a business combination to be a `merger of equals'. These
are, in practice, e®ectively unobservable to the extent that even case-based contextual
research struggles to identify them. `Merger of equals' is not proxied by other appar-
ently related constructs sometimes used in the literature, such as `friendly/hostile' or
`equity/cash consideration' { nor is it proxied by the use of pooling (merger) rather than
purchase accounting for the transaction.
In our data, ¯rm B was considered to have exited the industry if it was acquired by ¯rm
A. If, at the same time, ¯rm A changed its name to C, we treated A as remaining in in
the industry.
7This is the two-sided ¯lter of Hodrick and Prescott (1997).
9² The average annual real e®ective exchange rate is used to measure the
exchange rate environment. Goudie and Meeks (1991) have found that
a stronger pound sterling raises the propensity of ¯rms to go bankrupt.
Figures 3 and 4 plot the annual incidence of bankruptcies and of ac-
quisitions, as well as the business cycle indicator for the year. Incidence
is measured as the ratio of the number of companies that went bankrupt
(and the number that were acquired) during the year, to the total number
of listed companies. Quoted ¯rm bankruptcies were particularly high during
years when the economy turned down after a peak, and were lower during
upturns in the business cycle. The growth rates in ¯rm registration hint at
a plausible mechanism for this; entries are pro-cyclical and it is possible that
the larger number of entries during the upturn of the business cycle force
some ¯rms out of business when the economy turns down.
Figure 5 indicates that acquisitions were procyclical. Research on aggre-
gate mergers and acquisitions activity has found aggregate market capitali-
sation to be a determinant of acquisition demand. Similarly, earlier research
on ¯rm exits have found explanatory power in other measures of aggregate
economic activity. We experimented with several other measures, such as
Tobin's q, industrial production, stance of monetary policy and capacity
utilisation. and found the substantive conclusions of our estimated models
to be robust to variable selection. Thus our ¯nal choice of macroeconomic
variables has been guided by availability of consistent data over the 38-year
period, as well as by statistical variable selection methods.
4.2 Measures of macroeconomic stability
Figures 3 and 4 also suggest that even for mature (quoted) ¯rms, the in-
cidence of bankruptcy and acquisition vary substantially over time. While
a part of the aggregate movement may be explained by the business cycle,
macroeconomic stability may also have a role to play. It has been argued that
the impact of uncertainty on business performance is essentially asymmet-
ric. For example, in economies with credit constraints, credit imperfections
generate a transmission mechanism through which a small, temporary shock
can generate large, persistent domestic balance sheet e®ects. This feature
has motivated ¯nancial accelerator-type models (Bernanke et al., 1996), in-
cluding the borrowing constraint in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), costly state
10veri¯cation in Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and sudden stops in Calvo (2000).
The ampli¯cation e®ect can explain why a small fundamental problem can
evolve into a large-scale deterioration of economic performance. The credit
constraint, interacting with aggregate economic activity over the business
cycle can generates asymmetric e®ects in response to unexpected productiv-
ity shocks.8 There is related empirical work on mechanisms which create
asymmetric volatility responses (Engle and Ng, 1993).
Traditional measures of instability, for example those based on standard
deviations, are not able to capture these asymmetric e®ects. We use signed
gradients in monthly measures of macroeconomic indicators to identify sharp
variations. We use the following measures of macroeconomic instability:
² To measure exchange rate instability we use year-on-year variations in
the exchange rate.
² Price instability is measured by the largest month-to-month rate of
variation of the retail price index within the calendar year.
² Instability in long term interest rate is measured by the largest month-
to-month rate of variation within the calendar year, of yield rates on
20-year sovereign bonds.
4.3 Firm-level and industry-level characteristics
We include a number of variables characterising the ¯rm and its ¯nancial
performance, and controls for unobserved heterogeneity at the industry level.
² Firm size is measured as the logarithm of ¯xed capital in real terms,
incremented by unity.
² Pro¯tability is measured by the ratio of cash °ow to one-year-lagged
total assets.
8While a positive shock has only a small e®ect, a negative shock (even if temporary) can
reduce the value of collateral to a discounted liquidation value. Since the liquidated assets
cannot be restored when the shock is over, the ampli¯cation e®ect becomes persistent.
11TABLE 1: Sample characteristics of the explanatory variables9
Variables N Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
Industry Dummies
Food/ Breweries 48094 0054   
Chem./Pharma. 48094 0059   
Metals 48094 0012   
Engineering 48094 0101   
Electricals/Electronics 48094 0054   
Textiles 48094 0083   
Paper/ Packaging 48094 0056   
Construction 48094 0098   
Media/ Publishing 48094 0052   
ICT 48094 0040   
Trdg./Superstores 48094 0109   
Firm £ Year Level
Size: ln(rl.¯xed capl. + 1) 48094 4768 191 0 135
Cash °ow to Capital 48094 0160 199 ¡3886 914
Current ratio 48094 5936 1347 000 6763
Interest cover 48094 000 100 ¡1365 0896
Gearing 48094 000 100 ¡4229 1477
Macro- conditions
UK Business cycle 38 ¡0027 102 ¡239 297
Long-term real interest rate 38 2559 331 ¡982 645
$ ¡ $ exchange rate 38 ¡0184 100 ¡258 275
US Business cycle 38 0025 102 ¡246 199
Macro- instability
Increase in exchange rate 38 0014 099 ¡194 156
Volatility - RPI in°ation 38 0002 102 ¡240 290
Vol. - Long term int.rate 38 0007 103 ¡260 331
² We use current ratio, the ratio of current assets to current liabilities,
as a measure of liquidity.
9Some variables have been normalised or rescaled to facilitate interpretation of the
model estimates. These include ¯rm level covariates interest cover and gearing, and macro-
economic variables representing UK and US business cycle, exchange rate, and all measures
of macroeconomic instability.
12² Debt sustainability is measured using interest cover, the ratio of interest
expenses to pro¯ts before interest and tax.
² We measure the ¯rm's ¯nancial structure in terms of its gearing ratio,
which is the ratio of debt to the sum of debt and equity.
We experimented extensively with alternative ¯rm-level measures, but the
substantive conclusions from our models were robust to choice of variables.
In addition to the usual ratios, we estimated our model using lagged average
sales growth over the past 3 and 5 years, as a proxy for demand conditions.
Again, conclusions were robust, though the sample sizes were substantially
reduced.
Descriptive statistics are given in Table 1. The sample characteristics
display signi¯cant variability both across ¯rms, and over the 38 year period.
5 Econometric Methodology
There are a few empirical studies on ¯rm exits based on discrete outcome or
scoring models such as probit or logit,10 but the larger part of the literature
have relied on hazard regression models for inference. In our context, there
are two advantages to the use of hazard models.
First, these models explicitly incorporate the timing of alternative out-
comes, and therefore adequately account for sample selection due to censor-
ing. For example, the likelihood contribution for a ¯rm that went bankrupt
in 1980 would incorporate not only the information that the ¯rm went bank-
rupt, and was not acquired in 1980; but also the fact that it neither went
bankrupt nor was acquired in any of the previous years of its existence.
Second, hazard regression models can be used to explicitly segregate the
age aspect of the propensity to survive (or exit) from the e®ect of other
covariates. At the same time, this framework allows the e®ect of age on
the hazard to be completely °exible, and the e®ect of other covariates to
possibly vary with age of the ¯rm. This is important in disentangling the
10Multinomial probit/ logit models have been used by Corres and Ioannides (1996) for
analysis of competing causes of exit for US quoted companies. They also use a hazard
model in their empirical work, but do not segregate the hazard processes owing to di®erent
causes of failure. We also use a °exible logit model to check the robustness of our results;
this will be discussed in further detail later in the paper.
13in°uence of macroeconomic conditions on business exit from the in°uence of
¯rm-speci¯c and industry factors, as well as for understanding the role of
learning in mature ¯rms.
The model places the risks of bankruptcy and acquisitions in a uni¯ed
framework. Each ¯rm is conceived as being concurrently under risk of bank-
ruptcy and acquisition during each year of its life. In other words, bank-
ruptcy and acquisitions are mutually exclusive outcomes, in°uenced by their
own determinants, competing to restrict the survival of an operating ¯rm.
In a hazard model framework, this data generating process can be para-
metrised using a competing risk model where inference is based on the cause-





[   + ; = j ¸ ;] (1)
where  = 1 are the  competing causes of failure, and (0;) = 0; =
1. The Cox Proportional Hazards (PH) model provides a convenient
description of the regression relationship between the cause-speci¯c hazard
rates (Equation 1) corresponding to the competing causes of failure, and
various explanatory variables (covariates) describing the ¯rm's endowments
(), the macroeconomic environment () and macroeconomic instability
(), given the age of the ¯rm (). The model postulates that the logarithm
of the cause-speci¯c hazard function is a linear function of the covariates:






where 0() is the baseline hazard function corresponding to the -th cause
of failure (in the present case,  takes two values { bankruptcy or acquisition)
at age ,  is the vector of covariates (comprising ,  and ), and 
are the vectors of coe±cients corresponding to the -th cause of failure.
The parameters of the model are (a) the two baseline hazard functions,
0 (), corresponding to the two competing causes of failure, and (b) the
distinct vectors of covariate e®ects () for the two causes. In the following
subsections, we consider estimation in the simple case when proportionality
holds, and explain some additional features of our estimation procedure.
These include discussion of:
14(a) the assumption of conditional independence of the two competing exit
routes required for estimation,
(b) violation of the PH assumption and modeling nonproportionality through
age-varying covariate e®ects, and
(c) the e®ect of left truncation on the estimates.
Further checks on the robustness of our model estimates are discussed in
the Appendix.
5.1 Estimation under PH assumption
The assumption of proportional hazards is often violated in application and
sometimes contested by relevant theory. Respecting this, we allow covariate
e®ects to vary with the age of the ¯rm { This is a signi¯cant generalisation
of the PH model. We begin our discussion with ¯xed covariate e®ects, and
extend to the estimation of age-varying regression parameters.
Estimation of a Cox PH model in a multivariate duration model setting
is discussed in Wei et al. (1989) and Spiekerman and Lin (1998); their model
is similar to our regression model for cause-speci¯c hazard rates (Equation
2). Inference is based on \quasi-partial likelihood" estimating equations with
a working assumption of independence (Spiekerman and Lin, 1998). In our
competing risks setting, this assumption stipulates that censoring by the
competing risks must be independent of the age of the ¯rm at exit, conditional
on the observed covariates  11. In essence, this requires the selection of
covariates such that, after conditioning on them, the competing exit processes
are independent of each other. We discuss this conditional independence
assumption in more detail in the following subsection.
Following Spiekerman and Lin (1998), we express the log- \quasi-partial
11Note that the competing risks model is actually identi¯ed under a weaker condition
that the two competing exit processes are \non-informative" about each other (Arjas and
Haara, 1987; Andersen et al., 1993). However, asymptotic results are easier to derive
under independence, which we assume.































where () denotes the counting process for exits corresponding to the
-th competing risk, and () denotes the corresponding at-risk indicator
function (see Andersen et al., 1993). The above expression is the same as
the partial likelihood for a strati¯ed Cox model with two independent strata
and independent observations in each strata.
Our estimates of covariate e®ects, b , are the ones that maximise the
above log-\quasi-partial likelihood" (Equation 3)












are the corresponding Aalen-Breslow type estimators:












There are several notable features of this estimation methodology. First,
the quasi-partial likelihood (Equation 3) is valid under certain forms of unob-
served heterogeneity. Speci¯cally, estimation based on this quasi-partial like-
lihood accounts for unobserved heterogeneity arising from a common scalar
index of unobserved regressors for the two competing risks (Spiekerman and
Lin, 1998)12.
12Because of possible correlation between exit events in the presence of unobserved
heterogeneity, asymptotic results cannot be established using standard counting process
martingale theory approach (Andersen et al., 1993). One of the main contributions of
Spiekerman and Lin (1998) is to provide rigorous statistical results for this case.
16Second, estimation of the model is straightforward. It can be seen from
the form of the quasi-partial likelihood that estimating this model is equiva-
lent to estimating two separate univariate Cox regression models correspond-
ing to the two causes of failure { acquisitions and bankruptcies. Therefore,
the model can be estimated by maximising the usual strati¯ed partial likeli-
hood function (Cox, 1972). In other words, the estimation of the competing
risks model involves estimation of two separate Cox PH models, one for exits
due to bankruptcy and the other one for acquisitions. In each case we treat
exits due to the other cause as censored cases. However, unlike the univariate
hazard regression model, the interpretation of our parameter estimates will
relate to the cause-speci¯c hazard functions rather than the hazard functions
themselves.
Third, the data allow us to observe the year a ¯rm is listed and its year
of exit. Since age is recorded only in years, the latent duration data are
continuous, but observed durations are interval censored. Further, there is
also considerable variation in the ages of the ¯rms included in the sample.
For example, the oldest exit due to bankruptcy is observed at an age of 113
years post-listing, while for acquisitions the oldest observed case is 186 years.
Given the large range in age, we estimate the model in a continuous duration
framework using Cox partial likelihood estimates of the regression models
(Cox, 1972), thereby ignoring the interval censored nature of observed data.
It is, therefore, necessary to specify a method for handling ties in the ages
of ¯rms at exit while computing the partial likelihood (see Kalb°eisch and
Prentice, 2002). We use the Peto-Breslow approximation (Breslow, 1974) to
adjust for ties in computing the log quasi-partial likelihood and the martin-
gale residuals.
5.2 Independence of exits due to competing causes
As in the case of univariate Cox regression models, the inference procedure
presented above is valid only under the assumption that censoring is indepen-
dent of exit conditional on covariates included in the model. In the competing
risks model, exits are censored by competing causes of failure and hence we
have to explicitly make this assumption. Such independence can be achieved
by including all regressors in both the models13.
13See also.Andersen et al. (1993)
17Consider, for example, the regression model for the cause-speci¯c haz-
ard of exits due to bankruptcy. Under the competing risks data generating
process, some exits due to bankruptcy will be censored by acquisitions. Like-
wise exits due to acquisitions are not unconditionally independent of bank-
ruptcy exits. Therefore, in order to infer on exits due to bankruptcy, the
process by which ¯rms get censored (get excluded from the chance of going
bankrupt by exit through acquisitions, or any other reason) must also be
modelled along with the exit process. This requires that we include all co-
variates a®ecting the competing exit process (acquisitions) in the model for
bankruptcy. We assume that conditional on the covariates, bankruptcy exits
are independent of exits due to acquisitions, and vice versa14.
Thus, when we consider the hazard regression model for bankruptcy, we
include all the factors a®ecting acquisition hazard, and assume that other
forms of censoring are either independent or at least depend on the same
covariates. We deal in a similar way with the regression model for exit due
to acquisitions.
5.3 Age-varying covariate e®ects
It is well known that the Cox PH model substantially restricts interdepen-
dence between the explanatory variables and duration. Proportional hazards
imply that the coe±cients of the hazard function regressors are restricted to
constancy over time { an assumption that is frequently violated in empirical
application15. An appealing solution to such violation of proportionality is
to allow the covariate to have di®erent e®ects on the hazard according to the
age of the ¯rm. Several estimators have been proposed in the literature that
allow for such time-varying coe±cients in the Cox regression model. We use
the histogram-sieve estimators of Murphy and Sen (1991), which are intuitive
and permit practical and useful inference.
14In some cases, there may be unobserved heterogeneity, where the dependence between
the two exit types is not completely described by observed covariates. As discussed above,
our inference procedures are also valid under certain types of unobserved heterogeneity.
15Proportionality may be unreasonable from the point of view of relevant economic
theory. The e®ect of a covariate on the hazard is sometimes expected to be increasing
or decreasing in age (sometimes over the whole covariate space, and sometimes over a
subregion of the covariate space). This clearly constitutes a violation of the proportionality
assumption.
18This method involves dividing the duration scale into several intervals,
and including the continuous covariate interacted with indicator functions
corresponding to each of the intervals as covariates in a modi¯ed Cox PH
model. Since we expect a non-constant covariate e®ect, we would ideally like
to have a large number of intervals to capture this feature. An alternative
would be to use kernel based methods to estimate the covariate e®ect contin-
uously over duration (see Bhattacharjee, 2004). We divide the range in which
the ages of ¯rms fall into four intervals { the choice of the number of intervals
and the cut-o® ages was determined by considerations of parsimony and the
requirement that each interval should include su±cient number of exits (of
each competing type) and a balanced number of ¯rm-years (observations)16.
Our chosen 4 intervals are age 0 ¡ 4 years, age 5 ¡ 15 years, age 16 ¡ 25
years and age  25 years, post-listing. Each of these four intervals have
reasonable incidence from the total sample, covering 7569 (16 per cent),
13474 (28 per cent), 11817 (25 per cent) and 15234 (32 per cent) company
years respectively17.
Finding covariates that have non-proportional e®ects is an important step
in the implementation of the above methodology. We use two statistical tests
to ¯nd covariates that may have age-varying e®ects on the cause-speci¯c haz-
ard of either exit. The ¯rst is a test for the proportionality assumption based
on martingale residuals (Grambsch and Therneau, 1994), and the second is
a test that the e®ect of a given covariate does not vary with the age of the
¯rm (Bhattacharjee and Das, 2002). Both tests lead to a very similar selec-
tion of covariates. Our empirical results demonstrate that several covariates
have age-varying covariate e®ects, and segmentation of the duration scale in
characterising e®ectively the way the impact of a covariate varies over the
life of the ¯rm, post-listing.
16We also experimented with 3 and 5 intervals. With 3 intervals, we sacri¯ce some
°exibility in variation of covariate e®ects over duration, while for 5 intervals some of our
estimates are less signi¯cant because of lower sample size (number of company-years, but
more importantly number of bankruptcies) in each interval.
17The incidence in terms of number of bankruptcies is 49, 56, 51 and 50 respectively,
and in terms of acquisitions - 379, 555, 455 and 469 respectively.
195.4 Left truncation and robustness of estimates
In addition to right-censoring (by dependant competing risks), our duration
data are truncated to the left, in that they pertain only to the period after
1965. For a given ¯rm, the age at left-truncation is given by  = 1965 ¡ ,
where  is the listing-year of the ¯rm. The Cox partial likelihood esti-
mates based on a modi¯ed de¯nition of risk sets (delayed entry) are valid if
truncation and exits are independent either unconditionally, or at least after
conditioning on the included covariates. While there is no simple way to
test such conditional independence, the impact of dependence on estimates
can be examined by stratifying the sample with respect to age at truncation.
We evaluate the robustness of our results to dependent truncation by esti-
mating the age at exit models conditioned on di®erent ranges of the age at
left-truncation, and examining the sensitivity of model estimates. We also
estimate the models for sub-samples of the data based on di®erent starting
years. We truncate the sample at 1970 (instead of 1965), and estimate the
models for bankruptcy and acquisitions for this sub-sample.
The Insolvency Act of 1986 is likely to have had a mitigating e®ect on
corporate failures (Cuthbertson and Hudson, 1996; Liu, 2004)18. In order to
examine whether this has a signi¯cant e®ect on our results, we also estimate
the model for bankruptcy for the period from 1986 onwards.
In addition to evaluating left truncation, we check the robustness of our
estimates in other ways. First, we estimate comparable logit models for exits
due to bankruptcy and acquisition and compare the results with our hazard
model estimates. Second, we compute jackknife estimates of the model to
evaluate the robustness of our parameter estimates and their standard errors.
Results of these robustness tests and the check for impact of the Insol-
vency Act 1986 are presented in the Appendix. It is evident that our hazard
regression models for bankruptcies and acquisitions are robust. We do ¯nd
evidence of e®ect of the Insolvency Act 1986, but the conclusions from our
estimates for the period since 1965 are preserved. Bhattacharjee et al. (2003)
have found similar evidence of the impact of Chapter 11 legislation on bank-
ruptcies and acquisitions in the US.
18We are grateful to one of the referees for suggesting the relevance of this to our analysis.
206 Results
The maximum partial likelihood model estimates of the two models, for bank-
ruptcies and for acquisitions, are reported in Table 2. The reported estimates
are hazard ratios, which are exponentials of the estimates of the Cox PH
model regression coe±cients. These estimates are interpreted as the factor
by which the hazard would be increased if there were a one unit increase in
the covariate under consideration, other things equal. Hence, if the hazard
ratio is unity the covariate has no e®ect, while if it is 2, a one unit rise in the
covariate will double the hazard of exit.
The reported -scores are based on robust standard error estimates pro-
posed by Lin and Wei (1989). These are obtained using a sandwich estima-
tor, where clustering by year is adjusted fro by summing the score residuals
within each year before applying the sandwich estimator. The ¯t of models
is judged using a Wald chi-square test, and the validity of the proportion-
ality assumption by the tests proposed in Grambsch and Therneau (1994)
and Bhattacharjee and Das (2002). These tests help us identify two regres-
sors with age-varying covariate e®ects. The e®ect of these covariates (our
measures of instability in exchange rates and in°ation) are allowed to vary
over the age of the ¯rm using the histogram sieve estimator (Murphy and
Sen, 1991). Our checks for sensitivity of the estimates indicates that the
estimated models are quite robust (see Appendix).
6.1 Firm and industry speci¯c factors
Industry matters signi¯cantly for either form of exit. Textiles and construc-
tion companies are more likely to go bankrupt but less likely to be acquired.
While ¯rms in the paper/ packaging business are more likely to be acquired,
¯rms in the engineering and ICT industries have a lower acquisition propen-
sity. The broad division appears to fall along the traditional/modern divide.
Firm speci¯c characteristics have impacts suggested in the literature.
The rates of bankruptcy and acquisition decline sharply with size in the
higher size-ranges. Figure 5 shows the estimated hazard ratios against size-
percentiles after conditioning on other covariates. There is a sharp decline
of bankruptcy hazard with size. The ¯gure supports the stylised fact from
the acquisition literature that quoted ¯rms in the middle range of the size-
distribution are considerably more likely to be acquired.
21TABLE 2: Model Estimates
Variables Bankruptcy Acquisitions
Industry Dummies
(Base = all others) 100 100
{ Food/Breweries 08349(¡04) 11755(17)+
{ Chem./Pharma. 05888(¡13) 11079(11)
{ Metals 04341(¡08) 10671(04)
{ Engineering 12342(09) 07521(¡34)¤¤
{ Electricals/Electronics 09073(¡03) 11333(14)
{ Textiles 20297(33)¤¤ 08283(¡21)¤
{ Paper/Packaging 09958(¡00) 12053(22)¤
{ Construction 14754(17)+ 07650(¡31)¤¤
{ ICT 04191(¡17)+ 04400(¡52)¤¤
{ Trdg./Superstores 09224(¡03) 08940(¡15)
Firm £ Year Level
Current size:
ln(real ¯xed capital +1 ) 11935(10) 12390(38)¤¤
Size-squared 09614(¡19)¤ 09757(¡45)¤¤
Cash °ow to Capital 10086(01) 13683(80)¤¤
Current ratio 10062(13) 10105(87)¤¤
Interest cover 09619(¡48)¤¤ 09840(¡22)¤
Gearing ratio 10258(33)¤¤ 09978(¡01)
Macro-Economic Conditions
UK Business cycle 09831(¡02) 09371(¡16)
Long-term real interest rate 09855(¡05) 10225(21)¤
$ ¡ $ exchange rate 10383(04) 10216(08)
US business cycle 08515(¡22)¤ 12298(62)¤¤
Macro-Economic Instability
y-o-y increase in $ ¡ $ exchange rate = 
{ £ I(age 0-4 yrs.) 12722(19)¤ 08691(¡27)¤¤
{ £ I(age 5-15 yrs.) 12407(13) 08891(¡26)¤
{ £ I(age 16-25 yrs.) 10437(02) 10051(01)
{ £ I(age  25 yrs.) 10424(03) 09359(¡15)
Vol. - RPI in°ation = 
{ £ I(age 0-4 yrs.) 13044(12) 08644(¡18)+
{ £ I(age 5-15 yrs.) 10832(04) 08326(¡29)¤¤
{ £ I(age 16-25 yrs.) 06906(¡13) 08055(¡45)¤¤
{ £ I(age  25 yrs.) 06933(¡19)+ 08254(¡30)¤¤
22TABLE 2: Contd.
Variables Bankruptcy Acquisitions
Volatility - Long term int. rate 11886(09) 07297(¡58)¤¤
No. of ¯rms 4117 4117
No. of exits 206 1858
Total time at risk (in ¯rm-yrs.) 48094 48094
Log-likelihood ¡1357808 ¡12661188
Wald 2 goodness-of-¯t test 13511 38308
d.f. / p-value 290000 29000
2 test (PH assumption) 1492 3477
d.f. / p-value 290990 290251
Only macro-variables (log-lik.) ¡1399280 ¡1278016
LRT { Joint signi¯cance of
¯rm/ind. var. (d.f. / p-value) 160000 160000
Only ¯rm/ind.-variables (log-lik.) ¡1375086 ¡1271453
LRT { Joint signi¯cance of
macro. var. (d.f. / p-value) 130002 130000
z-scores in parentheses.
Parameters reported are hazard ratios (exponential of the regression coe±cient estimates).
Volatility is measured as maximum monthly di®erence during the year, divided by the no.
of intervening mths.
¤¤ , ¤and +{ Signi¯cant at 1%, 5% and 10%level respectively.
Firms with higher interest cover have a low exit hazard from both bank-
ruptcy and acquisitions. While a higher gearing enhances the risk of bank-
ruptcy, cash rich ¯rms and ¯rms with higher liquidity (with higher cash °ow
to capital ratio and higher current ratio respectively) are preferred as acqui-
sition targets.
6.2 Macroeconomic factors
We conditioned on the long term real interest rate and the sterling-dollar ex-
change rate. The long term rate has a signi¯cant impact only on acquisitions
while the exchange rate has no signi¯cant impact on either bankruptcy or
acquisition. We also conditioned on measures of both the UK and the US
business cycle. Only the US business cycle measure has a signi¯cant e®ect
on bankruptcies and acquisitions; apparently the US economy is a better
predictor of UK bankruptcies and acquisitions than the business cycle in the
UK itself. The e®ect of the US business cycle on acquisitions is particularly
23strong, possibly re°ecting the dominance of US acquirers in the international
acquisition markets in the period. We interpret the strong role of the US busi-
ness cycle as an indication of the importance of demand for acquired capital
from the international capital market in driving merger waves. In the case of
bankruptcy, the e®ect is likely to have been driven by demand for exports.
In comparison to general macroeconomic conditions, the impact of macro-
economic instability on business exits is more pronounced, and depends sub-
stantially on the age of the ¯rm since listing, particularly for acquisitions19.
Newly listed ¯rms are more likely to go bankrupt during the years when ex-
change rate changes are very sharp. On the other hand, acquisition hazard
for younger ¯rms is reduced during these years.
Price instability20 and volatility in long term interest rates subdued ac-
quisition activity signi¯cantly. While the e®ect of instability on bankruptcy
hazard is not signi¯cant for the entire period under analysis, the e®ect is
more pronounced for the recent period after the introduction of the Insol-
vency Act of 1986 (Table 3A, Appendix). Overall, our ¯ndings point to the
detrimental impact of macroeconomic instability on survival.
Figure 6 plots the baseline cumulative hazard functions of bankruptcy and
acquisition against the age of the ¯rm reckoned from listing date. Note that
the hazard of mergers is about four times that of bankruptcy, controlling for
covariates. While the baseline hazard due to mergers appears to be constant
over the lifetime of a ¯rm, post-listing, the baseline hazard due to bankruptcy
decreases with age upto about 20 years post-listing, arguably re°ecting a
learning e®ect. In the literature, evidence in favour of learning models has
been advanced from cohort studies of new young ¯rms, and it is interesting
to note evidence for mature ¯rms.
Figures 2 and 4 also present the year-wise predicted incidence rates of
bankruptcies and acquisitions against the observed incidence rates. The close
conformity between the two is noteworthy.
19The evidence of non-proportionality of hazards underscores the usefulness of the
Murphy-Sen histogram sieve estimators for inference in such non-proportional situations.
20Wadhwani (1986) provides an explanation for how in°ation volatility can contribute to
bankrupcy. Firms already in a state of ¯nancial distress can be tipped over into bankruptcy
as higher in°ation and higher nominal interest rates increases the service element of debt.
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Our objective was to examine the relationship between business exits and
instability associated with the macroeconomic cycle, focussing on large and
mature (listed) UK companies, over a long (thirty-four year) period. We dis-
entangled the joint determination of probabilities of two mutually exclusive
processes - ¯rms being acquired and ¯rms going bankrupt - by estimating a
competing risks model for the probabilities of exit in either form, in terms of
¯rm characteristics, industry and features of the business cycle. Our model
explains the observed time variation in the incidence of bankruptcy and ac-
quisitions quite well. The two types of exits are marked by di®erences in
the e®ects of ¯rm-level drivers, industry, macroeconomic conditions as well
as macroeconomic instability.
At the ¯rm level our ¯ndings corroborate earlier results; the baseline
hazard due to bankruptcy and mergers decreases with age after listing. Other
factors remaining constant, larger ¯rms and ¯rms with higher interest cover
are less likely to go bankrupt or be acquired. Firms with higher liquidity and
cash rish ¯rms are more attrative acquisition targets, and ¯rms with higher
gearing are more likely to go bankrupt.
To the best of our knowledge, our results on the impact of macroeco-
nomic instability on exits are new. There are notable di®erences in the way
in which recently listed ¯rms, and those listed some years previously respond
to changes in the macroeconomic environment. Uncertainty in the form of
sharp increases in in°ation and sharp depreciation of the pound sterling af-
fect freshly listed ¯rms adversely - they are more likely to go bankrupt during
unstable years. Acquisition activity is also subdued in these years. Further,
there are less bankruptcies and more acquisitions during an economic up-
turn, particularly when measured by the US business cycle. The ¯nding of
contemporaneous increase in bankruptcies and decline in acquisitions, in a
period of instability or low economic growth, suggests the need for further
work on assessing causal relationships between the two processes.
The results reported here underscore the importance of smooth macroeco-
nomic management for the corporate sector. In an era of globalisation they
also point to the role that may potentially be played by business cycles in
other economic regions in the determination of both forms of business exit.
International comparisons, estimating similar models for other economies
would aid understanding and policy. Estimates of a similar model for the US
25(Bhattacharjee et al., 2003) also points to an important role for bankruptcy
legislation.
APPENDIX: Robustness of model estimates
We examine the robustness of our results by comparing estimates of di®er-
ent models and estimates over di®erent samples of ¯rms (¯rm-years). Specif-
ically, we employ four di®erent tests.
TABLE 3A: Sensitivity of Model Estimates: Bankruptcy
Variables Full 1970 { 1986 { Trunc. Logit
Sample 2002 2002  · 17 model
Age Dummies
(Base = I(age 0-4 yrs.)) ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ 000
{ I(age 5-15 yrs.) ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡0458¤
{ I(age 16-25 yrs.) ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡0674¤¤
{ I(age  25 yrs.) ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡0690¤¤
Industry Dummies
(Base = all others) 100 100 100 100 100
{ Food/Breweries 0835 0897 1266 0807 ¡0139
{ Chem./Pharma. 0589 0616 0909 0543 ¡0504
{ Metals 0434 0470 1243 0442 ¡0843
{ Engineering 1234 1189 1492 1148 0229
{ Electrical/Electron. 0907 0901 1106 0937 ¡0075
{ Textiles 2030¤¤ 2062¤¤ 1916¤ 1960¤¤ 0704¤¤
{ Paper/Packaging 0996 0913 1213 0995 ¡0005
{ Construction 1475+ 1331 0891 1445 0391+
{ ICT 0419+ 0394+ 0374+ 0409+ ¡0873+
{ Trdg./Superstores 0922 0921 1431 0779 ¡0085
Firm £ Year Level
Current size:
ln(real ¯xed capital +1 ) 1194 1282 1304 1149 0161
Size-squared 0961¤ 0953¤ 0951¤ 0964+ ¡0036+
Cash °ow to Capital 1009 1043 0988 1003 0008
Current ratio 1006 1005 1003 1006 0006
Interest cover 0962¤¤ 0964¤¤ 0969¤¤ 0962¤¤ ¡0045¤
Gearing ratio 1026¤¤ 1025¤¤ 1015+ 1024¤¤ 0025¤¤
26TABLE 3A: Contd.
Variables Full 1970 { 1986 { Trunc. Logit
Sample 2002 2002  · 17 model
Macro-Economic Conditions
UK Business cycle 0983 0883 1079 0994 ¡0068
Long-term real interest rate 0985 0996 1006 0995 ¡0001
$ ¡ $ exchange rate 1038 1004 0951 1025 0111
US business cycle 0851¤ 0942¤ 0532¤ 0842¤ ¡0215¤¤
Macro-Economic Instability
y-o-y increase in $ ¡ $
exchange rate = 
{ £ I(age 0-4 yrs.) 1272¤ 1236+ 1712¤¤ 1296¤ 0228+
{ £ I(age 5-15 yrs.) 1241 1222 1393 1237 0240
{ £ I(age 16-25 yrs.) 1044 1051 1186 1035 0094
{ £ I(age  25 yrs.) 1042 1013 1249 0900 ¡0060
Volatility - RPI in°ation = 
{ £ I(age 0-4 yrs.) 1304 1376 3892¤¤ 1333 0321
{ £ I(age 5-15 yrs.) 1083 1201 3359¤ 1082 0138
{ £ I(age 16-25 yrs.) 0691 0823 3367¤ 0672 ¡0290
{ £ I(age  25 yrs.) 0693+ 0735 2424 0662 ¡0160
Vol. - Long term int. rate 1189 1251 1625 1230 0178
Constant ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡5138¤¤
No. of ¯rms 4117 3781 2878 3933 ¡
No. of exits 206 196 114 191 206
Total time at risk (¯rm-yrs.) 48094 41690 22059 44796 48094
Log-likelihood ¡135781 ¡128820 ¡69680 ¡129144 ¡125829
Wald 2 goodness-of-¯t test 13511 11792 10093 12140 12861
d.f. / p-value 29000 29000 29000 29000 32000
Parameters reported are hazard ratios (exponential of the regression coe±cient estimates).
Volatility is measured as maximum monthly di®erence during the year, divided by the no.
of intervening mths.
¤¤ , ¤and +{ Signi¯cant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
27TABLE 3B: Sensitivity of Model Estimates: Acquisition
Variables Full 1970 { Trunc. Logit
Sample 2002  · 17 model
Age Dummies
(Base = I(age 0-4 yrs.)) ¡ ¡ ¡ 000
{ I(age 5-15 yrs.) ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡0101
{ I(age 16-25 yrs.) ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡0402¤¤
{ I(age  25 yrs.) ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡0450¤¤
Industry Dummies
(Base = all others) 100 100 100 100
{ Food/Breweries 1176+ 1198+ 1207+ 0155
{ Chem./Pharma. 1108 1114 1134 0096
{ Metals 1067 1237 0999 0067
{ Engineering 0752¤¤ 0728¤¤ 0748¤¤ ¡0310¤¤
{ Electrical/Electron. 1133 1137 1104 0138
{ Textiles 0828¤ 0769¤¤ 0807¤ ¡0197¤
{ Paper/Packaging 1205¤ 1237¤ 1192¤ 0199¤
{ Construction 0765¤¤ 0809¤ 0782¤¤ ¡0279¤¤
{ ICT 0440¤¤ 0435¤¤ 0451¤¤ ¡0853¤¤
{ Trdg./Superstores 0894 0927 0901 ¡0119
Firm £ Year Level
Current size:
ln(real ¯xed capital +1 ) 1239¤¤ 1261¤¤ 1224¤¤ 0237¤¤
Size-squared 0976¤¤ 0974¤¤ 0978¤¤ ¡0027¤¤
Cash °ow to Capital 1368¤¤ 1401¤¤ 1372¤¤ 0338¤¤
Current ratio 1010¤¤ 1009¤¤ 1010¤¤ 0012¤¤
Interest cover 0984¤ 0990 0984¤ ¡0021+
Gearing ratio 0998 0996 0998 ¡0002
Macro-Economic Conditions
UK Business cycle 0937 0846+ 0947 ¡0073
Long-term real interest rate 1023¤ 1020+ 1021+ 0029¤¤
$ ¡ $ exchange rate 1022 0996 1024 0002
US business cycle 1230¤¤ 1400¤¤ 1243¤¤ 0179¤¤
28TABLE 3B: Contd.
Variables Full 1970 { Trunc. Logit
Sample 2002  · 17 model
Macro-Economic Instability
y-o-y increase in $ ¡ $
exchange rate = 
{ £ I(age 0-4 yrs.) 0869¤¤ 0853¤¤ 0874¤¤ ¡0167¤¤
{ £ I(age 5-15 yrs.) 0889¤ 0879¤¤ 0892¤ ¡0140¤¤
{ £ I(age 16-25 yrs.) 1005 0958 0999 0045
{ £ I(age  25 yrs.) 0936 0918+ 0923 ¡0095¤
Volatility - RPI in°ation = 
{ £ I(age 0-4 yrs.) 0864+ 0910 0845¤ ¡0074
{ £ I(age 5-15 yrs.) 0833¤¤ 0890+ 0812¤¤ ¡0140¤
{ £ I(age 16-25 yrs.) 0805¤¤ 0766¤¤ 0710¤¤ ¡0296¤¤
{ £ I(age  25 yrs.) 0825¤¤ 0871¤ 0784¤¤ ¡0165¤¤
Vol. - Long term int. rate 0730¤¤ 0763¤¤ 0711¤¤ ¡0275¤¤
Constant ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡3673¤¤
No. of ¯rms 4117 3781 3933 ¡
No. of exits 1858 1687 1789 1858
Total time at risk (¯rm-yrs.) 48094 41690 44796 48094
Log-likelihood ¡1266119 ¡1124955 ¡1228904 ¡767960
Wald 2 goodness-of-¯t test 38308 39227 36437 39789
d.f. / p-value 29000 29000 29000 32000
Parameters reported are hazard ratios (exponential of the regression coe±cient estimates).
Volatility is measured as maximum monthly di®erence during the year, divided by the no.
of intervening mths.
¤¤ , ¤and +{ Signi¯cant at 1%, 5% and 10%level respectively.
First, we estimate our models for di®erent ranges of the age at left trun-
cation. As noted earlier, the truncation duration  may be represented as
 = 1965 ¡ , where  is the listing-year of the company21 The truncation
duration  range shows considerable variation over the cross-section of ¯rms;
the ¯rst quartile (Q1), median (Q2) and third quartile (Q3) are 0, 1 and 17
years respectively. Since 1965 ¡  is known at the time of listing and is
therefore deterministic, it is likely that  is independent of the age of the
21For most companies in our sample, there is no delay in entering the panel after being
listed. For a small number of companies there is a 1 to 2 year delay.
29¯rm at exit. On the other hand, if characteristics of the ¯rms listed before
1965 are substantially di®erent from those listed more recently, we may have
some dependence between age at left truncation and exit age. We conducted
a formal test of independence (Tsai, 1990) of truncation duration  and the
(right-censored) age at exit. This test rejects the independence hypothesis for
exits due to bankruptcy at the 5 per cent level, but does not reject indepen-
dence for acquisitions. Despite dependent left truncation, our model for exits
due to bankruptcy would still be adequate if the two durations were inde-
pendent after conditioning on covariates included in the bankruptcy model.
We examine robustness by estimating separate hazard models for truncation
durations upto the median and upto the third quartile of the cross-sectional
distribution of . If the coe±cients are similar in signs and signi¯cance with
our estimates for the full sample, we are safe in concluding that our model
estimates are robust. The above estimates for truncation duration  · 17
years are presented, separately for bankruptcy and acquisitions, in Tables 3A
and 3B respectively.
Second, we truncate the sample at 1970 (instead of 1965), and estimate
models for this sample. These estimates are included in Tables 3A and
3B. Our estimates for the full sample are robust to truncation duration, as
indicated by their similarity to estimates for  · 17 years and for the period
1970-2002.
Third, we estimate logit models comparable with our estimated hazard
models. There are some important di®erences between hazard models and
binary response models such as the logit. Unlike the logit, hazard regression
models explicitly incorporate the nature of censoring inherent in duration
data, and are therefore more appropriate for our focus. Further, our hazard
regression model incorporates an important role for the age of the ¯rm in de-
termining the hazard rate of exits, in terms of nonparametric patterns for the
baseline hazard function and for age-varying covariate e®ects. The age e®ect
needs to be incorporated explicitly into the logit model. To allow for com-
parability with hazard model estimates, we use age-dummies in logit models
to allow for the e®ect of age to be °exible, as in our framework. Though not
exactly comparable, the estimated logit models allowing for °exible e®ect of
age since listing (presented in Tables 3A and 3B) return qualitatively similar
results.
Fourth, we employ a jackknife procedure, by removing one company at
a time from the sample and computing estimates based on all the other
30companies. Since di®erent companies return di®erent number of company-
years, removing di®erent companies would involve omitting di®erent number
of observations from the sample. In this sense, this is not a proper jackknife22.
The jackknife results for both the parameter estimates and their standard
errors are robust across various jackknife replications.
The above sensitivity investigations provide convincing evidence of the
robustness of our model estimates.
22An exact jackknife procedure is di±cult to devise in our case because we have an
unbalanced panel.
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